I believe that Iran/US relations needs a total strategic re-think.
I would love to see this done without bias. In economics we call this marginal analysis and we dearly try to avoid being swayed by sunk costs.
A little context:
Iran has been a nation state for centuries, much longer than the US; whereas the borders of much of the so-called Arab world, north of Saudi Arabia, were constructed by the French and English after WW I. Iran has the potential of being a stable country.
Somehow, Iran got caught in the middle of the early years of the Cold War. Their big problem was that the British relied on Iran for oil and the British were used to getting their way in the Middle East. Then, somehow, Iran democratically elected a communist to lead the country. Britain could not tolerate that. The US was allied with Britain, and also dependent on Middle East oil, though not necessarily from Iran, and worked together to overthrow a democratically elected government. (Hitler was democratically elected.) Britain had core interests. US had related interests. The government was replaced by a dictator, the so-called Shah, and he wasn’t an especially nice person. (Real conflict here with U.S. values.) So, from the early 50’s until the mid 70’s Iran was led by a government imposed on the Iranian people by the British and the U.S. This is a hard way to make friends.
However, during that period Iran made progress, developed a strong middle class and a reasonably educated population. (That trend seems to have continued through present day.)
Then all hell broke loose during that late 70’s, the Shah was thrown out, and replaced with a theocracy, and one that had very little use for the British or the U.S. (Without researching it, I assume that France continued doing business with Iran during most of these years – they not being at the center of all the disruption.) The new regime is also a dictatorship.
Then, Saddam set his eyes on Iran and declared war. The U.S. actively supported Saddam. It is said that over 500,000 soldiers and 100,000 civilians died in that war, with losses higher for Iranians. This war offered more evidence to Iran that the U.S. was not their friend.
So, let’s start with the fact that most of the problems between Iran and the U.S. from the 1950’s until 1990 had roots in the U.S. wanting to assert its interests over Iran’s, and in most cases, the U.S. was quite willing to invade Iran’s sovereignty.
Part II:
Iran is a Shia Muslim state, and it is led by a cleric. KSA is Sunni Muslin and is led by a secular King. Saddam was neither Sunni nor Shia, but he aligned himself with a minority Sunni population. Shia Muslims are over 60% of the population of Iraq. Afghanistan is 99% Muslim and said to be overwhelmingly Sunni. However, the border with Iran has been relatively quiet through the years. It also seems to be the case that Iran was relatively neutral throughout the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. (Much of what we did aligned with their selfish interests.) Let’s look at Syria. Sunni Islam dominates Syria. The Shia are about 5% of the population. The Alawites, a sect of Shia Islam, comprise a group of close to 20% between pure Shia and Sunnis. The USSR used to have border areas all over this region. Not so much now with only Russia.
So, given all of this, what appears to be the thorn in Iran’s foot? That is to say, what drives their national interest?
Perhaps survival as a Country? They have good reason to have such concerns. The Persians may be the oldest civilization on earth today. They were not created by Europeans or by any other Western battles originating on their side of the Atlantic.
Perhaps fear of encroachment from the West?
The Islamic cultural divide? Non-Muslims actually don’t understand this very well. I surely don’t. (of course, I know the history going back to the dawn of Islam.) But intense feelings exist on each side. Left to their own designs, Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims do not mix very well. In this religious regard, Iran is greatly outnumbered in the Middle East. Perhaps this creates insecurity?
Israel? When did Israel become an existential issue with Iran? I suppose it started with the overthrow of the Shah, thirty years after Israel became a material reality. Does the Iranian government use the Israeli conflict as a means to strengthen support within its own people, as most of the other Arab states have done for the last 70 years? Or does Iran have some other fundamental problem with Israel? (Most of the Muslims in Palestine are Sunni Muslims.) That is, why does Iran want to lead the crusade against Israel when the rest of the Middle East has become mostly exhausted by it?
Part III
So, my first question is whether Iran is motivated by defense, or whether they actually have an offensive strategy? I wonder deeply about this. I deeply worry that the U.S. has not thought rigorously about this. It is said that the Iranians want to control all of the territory from their Western border, through Iraq, into Syria, through to Lebanon. These are Arab counties. Their borders may be weak but their distinction from Persians is not. Persia would not seem to have a natural need to control these areas. The peoples of these regions are considerably poorer than Iranians and would actually be a liability. Moreover, Iran seems to have access to waterways on both the South and the North, another reason for wondering about their need for Western expansion. Finally, were Iran to grab territories in the West it might create a threat for both Turkey and for Russia. I think Iran needs Russia as a neutral state if not an ally. However, all we hear about in the U.S. political dialogue, for example, the Wall Street Journal, is Hezbollah, Syria, Shia Iraqis, etc. as the big power force against the U.S.
Part IV
I supported the Iran nuclear deal. These were my reasons:
First and foremost, I agreed with the Obama belief that if all of this conflict could be cooled down perhaps Iran would start feeling more secure and turn more inwardly for development rather than carry on the external plays that were bothering the group on the other side of the deal. Remember, this was not a U.S. deal. This was equally led by the largest European states who have much more stake in Iran than the U.S. will ever have.
We will never know whether such a development could have evolved from the Obama deal because the Trump Administration came in with a powerful bias against the deal – a Republican bias which Romney ran on – and simply walked from the deal.
Second, we must remember that all of this cash that was paid to Iran – which seems to come up all of the time – was their money. To wit:
“The $1.8 (actually $1.7 billion) was a debt owed to Iran, which bought military equipment from the U.S. that it never received because relations ruptured when the shah was overthrown in 1979.
—”The debt was in international arbitration for years. As part of that, Iran paid settlements of more than $2.5 billion to U.S. citizens and businesses.
—”$400 million, representing the principal and held in a U.S. government trust fund, was paid in cash and flown to Tehran on a cargo plane, which gave rise to Trump’s dramatic accounts of money stuffed in barrels or boxes and delivered in the dead of night.
“The remaining $1.3 billion, representing interest accrued over nearly 40 years, was paid separately. In order not to violate U.S. regulations barring direct U.S. dollar transfers to Iranian banks, the money was remitted to Iran in late January and early February 2016 in foreign hard currency from the central banks of the Netherlands and of Switzerland,” according to the Congressional Research Service .
Part V
So, now let’s address what Biden should or should not do.
First, they need to do a lot of fresh thinking. However Iran felt about U.S. threats to their existence when Obama left office, they feel worse now. And they have been doing something about it.
We need to know what our core interests are today. And, as Pope John Paul said to a UN assembly on October 2, 1979, maybe it is time that we look beyond our core interests and also factor in “our obligations and duties”. We are not blameless for this mess and it may be time to step up to that reality.
Second, the real threat from Iran now is precision guided missiles. These are the weapons that hit the KSA oil fields in the East about two years ago. (According to Tom Friedman, NYT, the Israeli’s were shocked by the technology and regarded that incident as a Pearl Harbor moment.) These are the weapons that could be aimed at Israel from Lebanon. Nuclear weapons are actually not the Iranian threat because Iran isn’t interested in committing suicide. The Iran deal outlawed the development of missile technology capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. My guess is that it was vague about precision guidance systems etc. purposed to deliver conventional weaponry. (Obviously, if the goal is to evolve to a set of stable, non-threatening relationships, such developments would not be helpful.) Now, I keep asking myself, what does Iran get out of launching missiles on KSA or Israel? All that does is piss off the United States and keep the world’s largest military power focused on Iranian behavior.
Third, as currently constituted, Iran’s actions are a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. However, our interests over there are not the same as they were even ten years ago. Moreover, Iran becomes a huge distraction from our focus on China, and also Russia, and maybe even Turkey.
Fourth, beware of KSA. MBS is an unstable force. Let us not get sucked into anything because he has problems with Iran. Many leading Saudi businesspeople were outraged when he entered the proxy war in Yemen against Iran five or more years ago. This has cost KSA billions of dollars.
Fifth, diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy. Maybe we ought to find out what Iran actually wants before we put our offer on the table. Isn’t that the core of the most rudimentary negotiating strategy? And maybe it will take us a couple years of stability to find out what they want.
So, if I were advising Biden today, I would say, with regard to Iran, do nothing. To the extent that the U.S. is covertly active in Iran, I would say, pause it until you understand what you really need to have. (That is, be reactive, not proactive.) To the extent that everybody is hot and bothered about the Iran nuclear deal, I would ignore the dialogue, stay silent, hold my cards, and wait for someone else to make the first move.
However, if I were Biden, I might put out a policy statement that stated unequivocally that the U.S. will not support Iran developing a nuclear weapon and that the U.S. will push back hard on Iran’s exporting of precision guided missiles to virtually anywhere.
If I were advising Biden, I would suggest that during the next year they focus on finding out what the Europeans want in Iran, and then the Russians and Israelis, and then the Chinese, and surely the Turks. The U.S. does not need to be forced into a specific role that suits these other players, for example, the role of Iran’s number one adversary. How about the U.S. adopting a role to be the peacemaker? Grind all of these different interests together and find an equitable solution. A strong Persian state is not necessarily at all a conflict with U.S. national interests.
Implied on all of the above is, of course, a position against returning to any previous model for dealing with Iran. We need fresh thinking, and we need it focused on long term strategic goals.
These are my opening thoughts.
